The energy part of Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent’s “3-3-3” plan aims to boost U.S. oil production by 3 million barrels/day by 2028, reinforcing Trump’s Energy Dominance push.
But can it work? Critics say no—markets set prices, not presidents, and oil companies drill for profit, not politics. Companies like Chevron and ConocoPhillips are maintaining or reducing capital spending, focusing on financial stability over increased production.
Critics miss the point. This isn’t market business-as-usual. Trump plans to supercharge production using emergency powers—a national energy emergency unlocks the National Emergencies Act and Defense Production Act to push projects through. Government, not markets, will drive the drill bit.
Many wrongly believe shale is “turning over.” It won’t last forever, but production should hold through Trump’s term. A deep analysis of 54,000 Permian wells supports this, aligning with my projections.
Permian output is set to plateau in 2025, holding for at least five years before shifting to lower-quality areas (Figure 1).
That raises questions about the “drill, baby, drill” part of the 3-3-3 plan.
“Three million more oil barrels equivalent a day from U.S. energy production. That would be my 3-3-3. That would substantially decrease the oil price, which – that’s one of the No. 1 drivers of inflation expectations. And then, back to the Fed, they could go into a proper easing cycle.”
Barrels of oil equivalent (boe) isn’t just crude—it includes NGLs, biofuels, and refinery gain to hit 3 mmb/d. I used EIA STEO data through 2024, projected 2025 with no immediate “drill, baby, drill” effect, and extended to 2028 using EIA’s Annual Energy Outlook.
The most likely case: crude and condensate up 1.5 mmb/d by 2028 (Figure 2). Adding NGLs and refinery gain brings the total to 2.4 mmb/d.
Barrels of oil equivalent includes natural gas. The most likely case: natural gas adds 1.2 mmboe/d by 2028 (Figure 3).
Liquids and gas together point to a 3.6 mmboe/d increase by 2028 (Figure 4). The high case is 5.5 mmboe/d, while EIA’s base case is 1.7 mmboe/d—based on 2022 data, that did not include AI-driven demand. The Energy Emergency order expands pipelines, increasing gas take-away and oil production. With rising gas demand and faster pipeline buildout, EIA’s base case looks too conservative.
What do these scenarios say about the lower oil prices Scott Bessent wants? Plenty.
In the most likely case, WTI averages $55 in 2027-28—down 25% from $77 in 2024. The low case? $49, a 35% drop.
There’s plenty of uncertainty here. The goal isn’t hard numbers but context on how big these shifts could be. Bessent’s focus is financial—cutting costs for Americans. It’s refreshing to see a leader who gets that inflation isn’t just about monetary policy and that energy matters.
Beyond energy, Bessent’s 3-3-3 plan targets 3% GDP growth and a 3% deficit cut. What’s missing is how the administration plans to use more oil, higher GDP, and lower deficits. Just selling more energy isn’t a strategy. Hopefully, it’s for strategic leverage, not just chest-thumping about growth.
Targeting Canada and Mexico first is a head-scratcher when China, Russia, and Iran are the real threats. There’s been movement on China, but how will these policies actually check our enemies?
Oil is China’s weak link, and Russia and Iran can’t fund their trouble-making without it. I’m still waiting to hear how U.S. energy will be used for real statecraft—how will it reverse the world’s geopolitical slide into something better through leadership, and not just fuel more waste and wreck the planet?
Trump’s tariffs and energy dominance signal a global zero-sum game—an unspoken admission that growth is over, and the superpowers are fighting over what’s left. If that’s reality, doubling down on the same playbook would be the worst move when a smarter geopolitical play might offer a real reset.