If U.S. President Donald Trump had already succeeded in his real core aim of changing the regime in Iran, the world would very different today — and Washington’s leverage over Beijing and Moscow would have expanded dramatically. A pro?West Iran, led by a government aligned with Washington, would control the vital Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el?Mandeb Strait, which together account for up to 45% of global oil flows. And with Washington directing the strategic framework, China would not continue receiving discounted Iranian oil if a major security crisis suddenly emerged. Washington’s strong relationships with other key oil and liquefied natural gas (LNG) producers in the region would also make it extremely difficult for China to source or transport energy from the wider Middle East. Beijing would be forced to fall back on Russian supplies — but if those had been further reduced by sanctions or by direct attacks from Ukraine or European powers as part of an expanded Russia?Ukraine conflict, China’s fallback options would be limited. In short, Beijing’s ability to project power across the Asia?Pacific — beginning with its long?planned ‘repatriation’ of Taiwan — would be significantly constrained. As it stands, Trump has not been able to engineer regime change in Iran, as he did in Venezuela, and it appears unlikely he will be able to do so. However, other elements of his three?tier strategy for a new global order have begun to take shape.
This emerging world order would likely be divided into three main spheres, as Trump has suggested on several occasions since his first term. His administration’s “2025 National Security Strategy” (NSS), along with recent public statements, reflects this tripolar vision — with the U.S. maintaining overall dominance and exerting direct influence across North and South America. China would hold the primary role in Asia, while Russia would either dominate or significantly influence Europe, depending on how any future conflict between European NATO members and Moscow unfolds. “The [U.S.] administration — even the current one — would prefer to deal with Europe, and so is Trump, despite what he’s said in recent weeks, but he’s happy enough to keep dealing with [Russian President, Vladimir] Putin if he needs to,” a senior source closely connected to the European Commission’s (E.C.) security complex exclusively told OilPrice.com last week. “This view [of the world split into three zones but with the U.S. still the leading superpower] is why Trump’s been keen to annex the bits he wants from elsewhere — such as Greenland, Canada, and the Panama Canal — before he focuses on the Americas,” he said. “It also aligns with several of his speeches where he said America shouldn’t keep fighting endless wars and should stop trying to maintain its role as the world’s policeman [analysed in depth in my latest book on the new global oil market order],” he added. “But, if there’s rising tensions between the U.S. and China, as he [Trump] thinks there will be, he wants to ensure that the U.S. and its allies are not at a disadvantage due to energy supplies, as they were last time [after Russia invaded Ukraine in 2022],” he underlined.
In the aftermath of the 24 February 2022 invasion, energy prices spiked as Russian supplies fell, causing months of economic disruption. Worse still from the U.S. perspective — a view shared by longstanding allies Great Britain and France — was that much of Europe, most notably its de facto political and economic leader Germany, had become so dependent on cheap and plentiful Russian energy that it was extremely reluctant to sanction the Kremlin, as also detailed in my latest book on the new global oil market order. This dynamic had been evident since Russia’s invasion of the sovereign European country Georgia in 2008 and its annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea region in 2014. Washington, London, and Paris believed that Europe’s reluctance to act after those earlier events effectively convinced Putin he could move into the rest of Ukraine without facing meaningful consequences. Conversely, Putin waited to launch the 2022 invasion until after the Beijing Winter Olympics ended on 20 February, avoiding disruption to Chinese President Xi Jinping’s major international showcase. And with almost supernatural foresight, China had spent the previous year steadily building up its LNG reserves, insulating itself from any immediate energy shock once the conflict began. After Russia moved into Ukraine in 2022, LNG became the world’s most strategically important energy source. Unlike pipelined gas, LNG can be purchased quickly on the open market and shipped rapidly to wherever it is needed, making it the critical buffer for countries scrambling to replace disrupted Russian supplies.
After the invasion, the U.S. not only coordinated major deals between major LNG producers — notably Qatar — and European countries to offset the loss of Russian energy supplies, but also sharply increased its own LNG exports to the continent. By the end of 2022, U.S. export capacity had reached roughly 11.4 billion cubic feet per day (Bcf/d), making it the world’s leading LNG exporter in the first half of that year. Since then, several major European oil and gas companies have moved aggressively to diversify the region’s energy sources through new ventures in Egypt, Libya, Iraq, and elsewhere — developments covered in detail in my latest book on the new global oil market order. Meanwhile, the U.S. has become the world’s leading LNG producer and exporter, rising from a near?standing start in 2016. Today, it remains by far the largest exporter, processing around 18 Bcf/d of natural gas into LNG. The U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA) projects that export capacity will double by 2031 compared with 2024 levels, as new projects such as Venture Global’s Plaquemines facility and Cheniere’s Corpus Christi expansion come fully online. “There’s an old phrase: ‘If you’ve got them by the balls, their hearts and minds will follow,’ and Trump knows that controlling energy is the way to do this,” said the European Commission source. “You saw it when he told the Europeans — when the Strait of Hormuz was closed — that they should just get their energy from the U.S. That’s what this is,” he underlined.
The U.S.’s growing dominance across global energy markets was underscored again last week when news emerged that Qatar might extend its force majeure on gas supplies beyond mid?June. Several major importers immediately signalled they would consider switching to U.S. LNG instead. Until its key North Dome (or ‘North Field’) gas site suffered Iranian missile attacks in March, Qatar had been one of the world’s top LNG producers. Qatari officials now estimate that fully repairing the damage to the North Dome facilities in Ras Laffan Industrial City will take three to five years, with significant implications for the emirate’s LNG export capacity in the meantime. The U.S. is also poised to use LNG leverage in Iraq to reduce Baghdad’s long?running dependence on Iranian gas and electricity for its power sector. U.S.-based technology and engineering giant KBR is serving as the consultant for Iraq’s first floating liquefied natural gas (FLNG) import platform, scheduled to be operational by June. The facility is designed to handle 500 million standard cubic feet per day (MMscf/d) of gas, with a technical ceiling of up to 1 Bcf/d. As exclusively analysed by OilPrice.com last year, U.S. firm Excelerate remains central to Washington’s effort not only to sever Iraq’s energy, economic, and political ties with Iran, but also to re?establish U.S. influence in Baghdad. Under a five?year renewable agreement with Iraq’s Electricity Ministry, Excelerate has a dual mandate: to operate the terminal that converts LNG back into the dry gas required for Iraq’s power plants, and to act as the LNG supplier. This effectively allows the company to prioritise U.S. gas and ensure supply reliability amid regional volatility. And in case the strategic significance of this shift was not already clear, Excelerate emphasised it directly in its summary of the deal: “The project has been developed in close collaboration with the Iraqi government and enjoys strong support from both Iraqi and U.S. government stakeholders… It represents not only a commercial partnership but also a strategic step toward enhancing Iraq’s long-term energy security.”
